Another Taliban statement in favour of negotiations

The Taliban's latest (unsigned) statement, issued yesterday, about President Obama's troop surge in Afghanistan makes some interesting claims about the alleged failure of coalition military operations in Helmand this summer. It also says that Washington has rejected a Taliban offer of peace (issued last week) based upon a Taliban guarantee not to meddle in the internal affairs of other countries. Not sure that this is true.
As if trying to reassure the West, the statement also refers to US national security advisor James Jones stating that most foreign fighters have left Afghanistan. This is probably a referrence to an interview he gave CNN on 4 October, when he said the "maximum estimate" for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was around 100 fighters. There has been other reporting suggesting a substantial falling out between the Quetta Shura and al-Qaeda, although this matter is still unclear and some reports say pro-war officials close to the White House have been playing up Taliban-al-Qaeda relations. Whichever way you look at it, this Taliban statement and several others issued recently (see below) clearly indicate a willingness to negotiate.

Taliban pledge no meddling in foreign internal affairs

An unsigned statement that appeared on the Taliban's website on Friday offers some interesting food for thought. The most important sentence in the statement reads as follows: "The Afghans, particularly the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, has no agenda of meddling in the internal affairs of other countries and is ready to give legal guarantee if the foreign forces withdraw from Afghanistan."
This is new and worth exploring in greater detail. Does it mean that al-Qaeda will be held to the same guarantee? How could it be enforced? Is this the majority view of the Quetta Shura? What about Hekmatyar and Haqqani?
The statement goes on to blame foreign forces for what it calls the "chaotic situation" in the country. "They handed over power to notorious warlords, venal officials and mafia-linked governors," says the statement.
It continues by noting that ISAF convoys are being escorted by "murderous militias involved in kidnapping and extortion of arbitrary taxes" who use official vehicles to transport heroin.
This latter point is undoubtedly true, and was the subject of an article in the Army Times on Wednesday (which is where the person who wrote the Taliban statement probably saw it). Sean Naylor's article refers to convoy escorts "wreaking havoc as they pass through western Kandahar province, undermining the coalition's counterinsurgency strategy".
The Taliban article also castigates the Karzai government for giving government land to warlords. "Government land in Shirpur, located to the north-east of the Kabul city is a good example. Once a property of the Ministry of Defense, now it is a posh area usurped by the warlords who have built luxurious houses there."
Again, this is true, but an old story, first reported in 2003 , when Karzai allocated government land to 30 of his ministers and officials. Squatters who had lived there for 20 years were evicted.
The statement makes it clear that even if the Taliban accept the principle of negotiation, they will not lay down their arms until all foreign forces have left the country.
One final point to note about this statement. It says that Afghanistan has become the location for a proxy war between different intelligence services. "Bomb blasts in public places are the work of these agencies," it says. India and Pakistan take note.

A soldier's strategy for winning in Afghanistan

One of the significant differences between the British and US armies is that the latter seem to be able to engage publicly in a much franker level of discussion about issues raised by the conflict in Afghanistan. Although the British Army allows blogs from soldiers serving in Helmand (see Frontline bloggers or Helmand Blog), these are little more than cheery news from the frontline about the latest successes. They don't set out to confront any of the serious issues and nor do they challenge official doctrine.
In contrast, there are some fascinating blogs and writings by serving US soldiers. One of the most striking of these is a pamphlet called One Tribe at a Time, by Major Jim Gant of the US Special Forces, published recently. In 2003 and 2004 Gant fought in Kunar and Helmand provinces before working as an adviser to an Iraqi National Police Quick Reaction Force battalion. He then spent the next two years as an unconventional warfare instructor for Special Forces.
Gant argues passionately that the key to success against the Taliban is to work with the tribes. He says: We demonstrated month in and month out that a small effective fighting force could unite with an Afghan tribe, become trusted and respected brothers-in-arms with their leaders and families, and make a difference in the US effort in Afghanistan. In doing so, we discovered what I believe to be the seed of enduring success in that country."
His strategy is based on the idea of Tribal Engagement Teams, working as part of an overall strategy that allows these teams working closely with a tribal group to decide how to engage the enemy. As Gant says: "TETs must be allowed to be on their own, grow beards, wear local garb, and interact with the tribesmen at all levels. They must be allowed to be what they are: American tribesmen...Rules of Engagement must change. Using the TETs will become a very intense, personal fight. If they need to drop bombs or pursue an enemy, they must be able to do so. The teams will always fight alongside Tribal Security Forces (TSFs), and no missions will be conducted unilaterally. There will always be an Afghan face on any mission."
It is hard not to feel that Gant has somehow 'gone native' while reading his pamphlet. He refers to a local tribal leader in Kunar as 'Chief Sitting Bull' and says things like: "I feels like I was born there. The greatest days of my entire life were spent in the Pesch Valley and Musa Qala and with the great 'Sitting Bull'...I love the people and the rich history of Afghanistan. They will give you their last abit of food in the morning and then try and kill you in the evening. A people who despite their great poverty, as as happy as any American I have ever met. A people who kill and fight and die for the sake of honor. A great friend and a worthy enemy."
Gant believes that specially trained soldiers can win trust with Afghan tribes and gradually spread their influence across the country. He speaks eloquently of his own experiences in Kunar where his special forces group were able to win over one tribal grouping - and to be treated as fellow tribesmen.
All of this, to anyone who has never visited Afghanistan before, is very intoxicating. Afghan friendship is something special. And for Gant and his comrades, there is something very heroic about these Pashtun fighters. They uphold many of the values he himself holds most dear - although Gant does not care to mention any of the less 'heroic' values that sometimes go with village life, such as honour killing of women.
In truth, it is unlikely that the generals of the US Army would allow small groups of soldiers to embed themselves in Afghan tribes - or that any kind of coherence would be the result. As Gant may know, feuding is a national pastime in parts of Afghanistan, much of it between close relatives. Almost the first action through which Gant won trust from his hosts was a threat against another tribal group that had taken over some land. How do you decide who is right?
Gant's pamphlet is a very human document. He came to Afghanistan as a soldier and found men to whom he could relate and who impressed him with their warrior qualities. He is not the first person to whom this has happened. Nor will he be the last.
In the introduction to his pamphlet, Gant says he started writing it in 2008 after he received orders to return to Afghanistan. It was to have been his 'Intelligence Preparation for the Battlefield' (IPB) document. A few days before he was due to leave for Afghanistan early in 2009, he was told he was not being sent there after all. Instead he was being sent to 1st Armored Division for a return tour to Iraq. Make of that what you will.

American anthropologists unhappy with HTS

More on anthropologists and the US Army's Human Terrain System (see my entry for 24 Nov). At its annual meeting in held in Philadelphia this week, the American Anthropological Association published another report on the Human Terrain System. Its Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) published its Final Report on The Army’s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program which has been gestating since December last year.
The report notes that HTS and similar programs are becoming a greater fixture within the US military, a fact that should be a "source of concern" for the AAA and for any social science organisation or federal agency "that expects its members or employees to adhere to established disciplinary and federal standards for the treatment of human subjects".
In fact there are a total of 27 Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) teams, 21 of which are in Iraq and six in Afghanistan. Those working for the HTS go through a four-and-a-half month training programme before being placed into a Human Terrain Team.
At present HTS has 417 employees (including deployed team members, personnel in training, RRC members, and program staff, including both military and non-military personnel). Of those, 135 have an MA degree, 11 are ABD, 49 have a PhD, and 33 have other technical or military degrees.
The report says that any anthropologist working for HTS will have difficulty reconciling potentially irrreconcilable goals and in determining whether or not s/he will be able to follow the AAA's disciplinary Code of Ethics.
The key statement is as follows: "When ethnographic investigation is determined by military missions, not subject to external review, where data collection occurs in the context of war, integrated into the goals of counterinsurgency, and in a potentially coercive environment – all characteristic factors of the HTS concept and its application – it can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology."
The AAA does not rule out entirely the possibility of constructive engagement between anthropology and the military, although its panel suggests that the organisation should emphasise the incompatibility of HTS with disciplinary ethics and practice for job seekers.
One obvious point, if the HTS is beyond the pale for the AAA, what about the university departments - for example at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, which offers Afghanistan Immersion training - that offer courses for HTS employees? How do they feel about their role?

More US troops needed in Kandahar - report

As US commanders consider how they are going to deploy an extra 30,000 troops in Afghanistan in the next few weeks, they may be considering a strategy spelt out in a report from the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War.
Written by Carl Forsberg, who has also worked at the US Marine Corps Intelligence HQ and for the Ugandan State Minister for Disaster Relief and Refugees in Kampala, The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar argues that The Quetta Shura of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has made the province of Kandahar, including the city itself, a primary objective of its campaign in the south of the country. Since 2004 it has taken control of the districts around the city one-by-one, with the result that by the end of 2008 its forces could use these areas to launch attacks on the provincial capital itself.
In contrast, ISAF has failed to prioritise the province over Helmand and has also failed to position sufficient forces within the city. Due to lack of troops, ISAF has only been able to disrupt the Taliban in Kandahar, but not eradicate it. Forsberg says ISAF should use enough troops to neutralise the Taliban in Kandahar, which is a necessary first step to reversing the Taliban's gains throughout the south of Afghanistan.
The problem with Forsberg's argument is that it cannot show how an increase in troops in the city will defeat the Taliban. The Canadians and the US battalion fighting in Arghandab to the north of the city have both been badly stung by Taliban fighters, who clearly have substantial support in the area. Indeed Forsberg himself points this out, noting "The Taliban’s judicial system, regularized taxation, oversight mechanisms, complaints committees, and protection of opium growers all demonstrate a clear concern with winning local support" and "The Taliban’s desire to win public support in occupied areas through their judicial code is also demonstrated by their willingness to moderate the harsh legal prohibitions on entertainment they had taken during their tenure in power during the 1990s. Radio, television, and the shaving of beards are no longer outlawed by the Taliban in Kandahar, although such activities remained rare in many Taliban-controlled villages due to a reigning conservative social culture."
If only it were possible to compliment the Karzai government in the same way.
The issue today is not military defeat of the Taliban. This is unlikely, even with the extra troops now heading to Afghanistan. A greater troop presence in the crowded confines of the city and surrounding connurbations will only lead to civilian deaths and even greater disenchantment. The only military strategy that makes sense now is one that drives a wedge between Mullah Omar on the one hand and the al-Qaeda-inspired jihadists who are using the Afghans to further their own heretical aims.

US govt defends its policy on Afghanistan

On Wednesday afternoon at 1.30pm Washington time Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, will all be giving evidence to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the subject of US Strategy in Afghanistan. Should be interesting. You can watch it live on TV here.

Rumsfeld the architect of bin Laden's escape

The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator John Kerry, has just published Tora Bora Revisited: How we failed to get bin Laden and why it matters today (funny how committees are now apeing the publishing world's fad for overlong and complicated titles!).
It re-examines the farcical and half-hearted attempt to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban regime in December 2001. They failed and the reasons are neatly summed up in the report:
"Fewer than 100 American commandos were on the scene with their Afghan allies and calls for reinforcements to launch an assault were rejected. Requests were also turned down for U.S. troops to block the mountain paths leading to sanctuary a few miles away in Pakistan. The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines. Instead, the U.S. command chose to rely on airstrikes and untrained Afghan militias to attack bin Laden and on Pakistan’s loosely organized Frontier Corps to seal his escape routes. On or around December 16, two days after writing his will, bin Laden and an entourage of bodyguards walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan’s unregulated tribal area."
It was the former US defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his military commander, General Tommy Franks, who made the incomprehensible decision not to reinforce the commandos, believing that large US forces would face a backlash and that, anyway, the war could be won by small groups of special forces acting in concert with local warlords. It is hard not to draw the conclusion that Rumsfeld is a dangerous idiot.
The Senate committee report makes it clear that, despite earlier denials, there was plenty of evidence that bin Laden and his senior commanders were at Tora Bora. The official history of the US Special Operations Command says: "All source reporting corroborated his presence on several days from 9-14 December".
As this report was produced by a Democratic-majority committee, its political overtones should not be dismissed. But before they become too complacent, the committee members may well want to consider how history will judge US policy in Afghanistan since January 2009.

How to bring peace through reconciliation

When Michael Semple, the Irish-born and Dari-speaking UN deputy head of mission in Afghanistan was expelled from that country in December 2007 for allegedly talking to the Taliban, it was widely recognised that this was a major blow to Western efforts at reconciliation.
Semple was expelled together with Mervyn Patterson, a British-born UN official after they travelled to Helmand and made contact with tribal leaders close to the Taliban. The Afghan security services believed they were involved in unauthorised contacts and were offering to pay commanders who defected.
Although it was not said openly, the suspicion was that both men were working for MI6. It later transpired that both men were the victim of petty jealousies, with one local leader reporting them to the Afghan intelligence service because he feared being marginalised.
Semple and Patterson insisted that their talks were legitimate. In part they were based on theories that Semple has now outlined in much greater detail in a new publication called Reconcialiation in Afghanistan, published by the United States Institute for Peace.
In this short, but very readable book, Semple outlines his argument that peace is achievable in Afghanistan. He says two-thirds of the Taliban are fighting not for idealogical reasons, but due to local conflicts and that these networks can be persuaded to reach an accommodation with the government.
Semple says his book is based on interviews between 2004 and 2007 with around 200 Afghans who had been involved directly or indirectly in the country's insurgency, ranging from senior Taliban leaders to the lowest level of insurgent. At least one was a provincial commander. "Many of the men expressed their aspirations for the future," writes Semple, "and none of them came across as crazy or fanatic."
The book gives excellent descriptions of all the attempts to date to open negotiations with insurgents in Afghanistan and offers many strategies for continuing that process. He says:
"To date, the focus of the Afghan government and international partners has been primarily on achieving subjugation or co-option of the armed opposition. But these efforts have achieved little strategic effects, partly because the fear of appeasement or capitulation has been used to deter potially effective measures of accommodation."
This book should be required reading for all military personnel in Afghanistan.

Claims that Blackwater is active in Pakistan

In a remarkable article published in The Nation, US journalist Jeremy Scahill alleges that the controversial private security company Blackwater (now known as Xe) is involved in a "secret war " in Pakistan, involving the planned assassination of suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives.
He says his main unnamed source "has worked on covert US military programs for years, including Afghanistan and Pakistan," and has direct knowledge of Blackwater's activities. If he is correct, his allegations will have a massive impact in Pakistan, which is already awash with rumours involving Blackwater.
The potential for blowback is enormous. Already many people in Pakistan are convinced that several recent car bombings, particularly in Peshawar in the North West Frontier, are the work of foreign intelligence agencies.
Two weeks ago, al-Qaeda's commander of military operations in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu Yazid, issued a statement on the subject:
"Today, everyone knows what Blackwater and the criminal security contractors are doing after they came to Pakistan with the support of the criminal, corrupt government and its intelligence and security apparatus. They are the ones who commit these heinous acts, then accuse the Mujahedeen of their crimes."
According to Scahill, who is the respected author of Blackwater: The rise of the World's most powerful Mercenary Army (Serpent's Tail, 2007), Blackwater is continuing to work in Pakistan, even though a covert CIA program was closed down in June 2009. Its operatives, almost all ex-special forces, are working with the US Joint Special Operations Command to plan actions that are then carried out by the US Army.
In addition, says Scahill, Blackwater has a contract with a Pakistani company called Kestral Logistics, which specializes in military logistical support, private security and intelligence consulting and is staffed with former high-ranking Pakistani army and government officials. He adds that his sources have told him that Blackwater staff often take part in Kestral actions, particularly along the border with Afghanistan where they are known to work with the Frontier Corps.
Blackwater staff also work on two drone programs in Pakistan - one for the CIA and another for the JSOC. A source in military intelligence told Scahill: "So when you see some of these hits, especially the ones with high civilian casualties, those are almost always JSOC strikes."
None of Scahill's sources are named, nor does he appear to have any physical evidence or photos for the claims he makes. Blackwater, the US Army, the US Ambassador to Pakistan have all denied the story. So far the Pakistani press has been subdued on the subject. But all that could change very quickly and the consequences for the military campaign against the Islamist militias in Pakistan will be immense.

Anthropology and the US Army

The death of an American anthropologist embedded with a US Army platoon in southern Afghanistan last February has not stopped the controversial $250 million Human Terrain System (HTS) programme, under which anthropologists are embedded with army units in order to produce in-depth analysis of the tribal and social structure of communities in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
I spotted this ad from the British company BAe Systems which is recruiting staff to work as analysts for the HTS Research Reachback Cell, based in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to produce "culturally specific details in support of operational planning and related activities".
In February, anthropologist Paula Loyd died after a man in a village in southern Afghanistan poured inflammable liquid over her and set her on fire. Soldiers with her shot and killed her attacker. She was the third person on the HTS programme to die in the field. More on the background here.
Academia has always had reservations about such work. In November 2007, a year after the HTS was established, the American Anthropological Institute issued a statement advising its members to take extreme care before working with the military:
"We advise careful analysis of specific roles, activities, and institutional contexts of engagement in order to ascertain ethical consequences. These ethical considerations begin with the admonition to do no harm to those one studies (or with whom one works, in an applied setting) and to be honest and transparent in communicating what one is doing."
That has clearly not stopped people working for the HTS. The BAe Systems advert does not insist on a degree, but says candidates must have a minimum of seven years experience in intelligence analysis and production, civil affairs or psychological operations. Those recruited will work as members of a "cultural research team consisting of multi-discipline analysts and area subject matter experts providing regional cultural and analytical expertise to military decision makers in support of current operations". This would appear to go against the AAI guidelines.
It is interesting to note that some of the HTS output is in the public domain. My cousin's enemy is my friend: A study of Pashtun "tribes" in Afghanistan is a fascinating document. Published in September, it eloquently argues that the tribal system in Afghanistan is much misunderstood. Pashtuns do not operate along tribal lines, but along qawm lines. A qawm is a group with a specific interest which may cut across tribal and ethnic lines. In addition, the report points out that there is a traditional hostility between cousins on the father's side. Numerous feuds are based on this rivalry. The report states:
"In this report, the HTS Afghanistan RRC warns that the desire for “tribal engagement” in Afghanistan, executed along the lines of the recent “Surge” strategy in Iraq, is based on an erroneous understanding of the human terrain. In fact, the way people in rural Afghanistan organize themselves is so different from rural Iraqi culture that calling them both “tribes” is deceptive. “Tribes” in Afghanistan do not act as unified groups, as they have recently in Iraq. For the most part they are not hierarchical, meaning there is no “chief” with whom to negotiate (and from whom to expect results). They are notorious for changing the form of their social organization when they are pressured by internal dissension or external forces. Whereas in some other countries tribes are structured like trees, “tribes” in Afghanistan are like jellyfish."
What is remarkable about this report is the fact that just as it was being published, the US army revealed that it was attempting to build a system of tribal militias in Afghanistan. The militias have little chance of success if any of the research from the HTS is to believed. A case of one hand not knowing what the other is doing?